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INTRODUCTION 
Cars crash.  So too will autonomous vehicles, a new 
generation of vehicles under development that are capable of 
operating on roadways without direct human control.1  A 
critical factor with respect to the feasibility of such vehicles is 
how often and with what severity such crashes will occur.  If 
autonomous vehicles have statistically more, or more severe, 
accidents than standard cars, then such vehicles will not be 
legally viable for widespread use.  Judges and juries will 
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 1. See generally Matthew Michaels Moore & Beverly Lu, Autonomous 
Vehicles for Personal Transport: A Technology Assessment, (Social Science 
Research Network, Working Paper, 2011), available at http://www.pickar. 
caltech.edu/e103/Final%20Exams/Autonomous%20Vehicles%20for%20Personal
%20Transport.pdf. 
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likely treat a vehicle manufacturer who has substituted a 
riskier autonomous vehicle for a safer conventional vehicle 
harshly. 
On the other hand, if autonomous vehicles reduce the 
frequency and/or severity of accidents, liability will still be an 
important and potentially limiting consideration for 
manufacturers.  Liability, in that case, requires an analysis of 
three key factors.  First, who will be liable?  Second, what 
weight will the court’s finder of fact give to the overall 
comparative safety of autonomous vehicles when determining 
whether those involved in a crash should be held liable?  
Third, will a vehicle “defect” that creates potential 
manufacturer liability be found in a higher percentage of 
crashes than with conventional vehicle crashes where driver 
error is usually attributed to be the cause?  Depending on the 
answers to these questions, liability has the potential to 
present a significant deterrent to the development of 
autonomous vehicles, even though such vehicles would 
provide an overall safety benefit relevant to today’s driver-
controlled cars. 
This Article assesses the potential interactions between 
legal liability and autonomous vehicles.  It begins in Section I 
with a discussion of the relevant liability doctrine and 
precedents from other technologies that may indicate how 
judges and juries are likely to allocate liability for 
autonomous vehicle crashes.2  Section II then examines who 
might be held liable for an autonomous vehicle crash.3  
Section III assesses the relative risk issues that are likely to 
be the key determinants of liability.4  Finally, Section IV 
discusses some potential liability protections available to 
manufacturers.5  These include the assumption of risk 
defense, potential legislative interventions limiting liability, 
and federal preemption of state tort claims. 
I. LIABIITY DOCTRINE AND RELEVANT PRECEDENTS 
There are two key doctrinal issues in determining tort 
liability for personal injury.  First is the theory of liability. 
 
2. See infra notes 6–19 and accompanying text. 
 3. See infra notes 20–31 and accompanying text. 
 4. See infra notes 32–56 and accompanying text. 
 5. See infra notes 57–74 and accompanying text. 
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Potential theories of liability include negligence, strict 
liability, and breach of implied warranty of merchantability.  
In the context of automotive crash injuries, negligence and 
strict liability are the two most common theories, usually 
raised in the alternative by plaintiffs.  A negligence claim 
considers the reasonableness of the defendant’s actions, 
usually measured in terms of industry standard of care or a 
cost-benefit analysis.  Strict liability, in contrast, historically 
was intended to apply liability to a party that caused the 
injury, regardless of fault.  Courts, however, have retreated 
from applying strict liability in its absolute form, instead 
tempering it with some sort of reasonableness consideration 
in most applications.  To that extent, the standard for strict 
liability begins to converge with the standard for negligence, 
and thus the two are considered together in the discussion of 
defects and liability that follows below.6 
The second issue in determining liability is the type of 
defect in the product which gives rise to the liability.  The 
Restatement (Third) of Torts states that product liability 
requires that a product must be found to have at least one of 
three categories of “defect” before liability can be imposed.7  
The first category is a manufacturing defect, where the 
product “departs from its intended design even though all 
possible care was exercised in the preparation and marketing 
of the product.”8  This first category of defect is unlikely to 
apply very often to autonomous vehicles, since modern 
manufacturing methods, especially for critical components of 
autonomous vehicles such as the software and navigation 
systems, can be manufactured with low error rates.  A second 
category of potential defect is a failure to provide adequate 
instructions or warnings, which applies “when the foreseeable 
risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced 
or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or 
warnings . . . and the omission of the instructions or warnings 
renders the product not reasonably safe.”9  Most jurisdictions 
limit this duty to warn of risks that could be “reasonably” 
known at the time of sale.  The manufacturer of an 
 
 6. The one difference is in manufacturing defects, discussed below, which 
does apply a true strict liability standard. 
 7. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCT LIABILITY § 2 (1997). 
 8. Id. § 2(a). 
 9. Id. § 2(c). 
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autonomous vehicle may, therefore, have a duty to disclose 
known risks of failure, including any known or suspected 
failure modes.  Since the manufacturer of an autonomous 
vehicle will seek to engineer out, or at least understand, any 
risks involved in the vehicle, system or component failure, the 
required warnings should be quite limited.  As such, the duty 
to disclose those risks should be relatively easily discharged 
in most cases. 
The third and most significant type of defect for 
autonomous vehicles, as with many products, is a design 
defect.  The standard for a design defect is that “the 
foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have 
been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable 
alternative design . . . and the omission of the alternative 
design renders the product not reasonably safe.”10  This is 
called the “risk-utility test.”11  An alternative test, called the 
“consumer expectation test,”12 inquires what level of safety a 
reasonable consumer would expect from the product in 
question; yet this test is losing favor in many states, and is 
generally considered particularly inapplicable in cases 
involving the analysis of technical and scientific 
information.13 
Autonomous vehicles have not yet been commercially 
deployed.  Not surprisingly, there has not been any reported 
personal injury litigation regarding these products to date.  
There are, however, a number of analogous technologies that 
have been the subject of litigation.  These cases may provide 
some useful hints as to how courts and juries are likely to 
apply the product liability doctrine to autonomous vehicles.14  
Industrial robots, for example, have played a role in a large 
number of employee injuries, resulting in the robots’ 
manufacturers being named in a number of subsequent 
lawsuits.  Though most incidents appear to be attributed to 
 
 10. Id. § 2(b). 
 11. Aaron D. Twerski & James A. Henderson, Jr., Manufacturers’ Liability 
for Defective Product Designs: The Triumph of Risk-Utility, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 
1061, 1065 (2009). 
 12. Douglas A. Kysar, The Expectations of Consumers, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 
1700 (2003). 
 13. E.g., Montag v. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 75 F.3d 1414 (10th Cir. 1996). 
 14. For additional discussion of such liability, see M. Ryan Calo, Open 
Robotics, 70 MD. L. REV. 571, 594–600 (2011). 
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the employees’ failures to take proper safety precautions15 or 
employees’ decisions to disable available safety features of the 
machines,16 these cases highlight manufacturers’ 
vulnerability to lawsuits in accidents involving their 
products. 
The dozens of suits brought against car manufacturers 
for accidents attributed to the cars’ cruise control systems are 
more relevant to autonomous vehicles.  Plaintiffs are often 
successful in alleging17 that the cruise control systems caused 
the cars to unexpectedly accelerate and fail to respond to 
braking.18 
Finally, airplanes capable of flying on “autopilot” (while 
also manned by a live pilot) provide a close analogy to 
autonomous vehicles.  At least one case involving a collision of 
an auto-piloted plane has been litigated.  While the plane 
that was controlled by autopilot was found to be the cause of 
the collision with another plane, the court attributed the 
error to the pilot rather than the design of the autopilot 
feature of the plane, with the judge opining that, “[t]he 
obligation of those in charge of a plane under robot control to 
keep a proper and constant lookout is unavoidable.”19  
Whether these cases will have any relevance to the courts’ 
treatment of emerging autonomous vehicle technology is 
difficult to predict. 
 
 
 15. See, e.g., Payne v. ABB Flexible Automation, Inc., 116 F.3d 480 (8th Cir. 
1997), in which employee was fatally injured by a robot used to construct 
automobile wheels after he failed to comply with safety measures requiring him 
to “lock out” the robot and to slow the speed of the robot before entering its ‘cell.’ 
 16. See, e.g., Edens v. Bellini, 597 S.E.2d 863 (S.C. Ct. App. 2004), in which 
employee was fatally injured by a robotic shuttle used to transport wool, after 
the robot’s operator disabled the pressure-sensitive safety mats that signaled 
the robot to stop automatically if they were triggered by someone stepping on 
them. 
 17. See, e.g., Cole v. Ford Motor, Co., 900 P.2d 1059 (Or. Ct. App. 1995) 
(explaining that the jury awarded $375,000 to plaintiff whose car allegedly 
accelerated when the driver pushed the brake pedal, causing the driver to lose 
control and crash into a guard rail). 
 18. See, e.g., Watson v. Ford Motor Co., 699 S.E.2d 169 (S.C. 2010); Ashley 
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 666 So.2d 1320 (La. Ct. App. 1996); Lawrence v. Gen. 
Motors Corp., 73 F.3d 587 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 19. Brouse v. U.S., 83 F. Supp. 373, 374 (N.D. Ohio 1949). 
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II. WHO WILL BE HELD LIABLE? 
In a conventional vehicle crash, the accident is usually 
attributable to one of, or a combination of, three primary 
possible causes: (i) the driver; (ii) a vehicle malfunction or 
defect; and/or (iii) unavoidable natural conditions (weather, 
road conditions, animal on the road, etc).  Any liability is 
usually allocated to one or both of the first two potential 
causes—the driver and the vehicle manufacturer.  In a multi-
vehicle crash, there may be two or more drivers and vehicle 
manufacturers involved, each of which could potentially be at 
fault in whole or in part, and therefore, potentially liable.20 
Autonomous vehicles are likely to change the dynamics of 
who may be held liable.  In considering these changes, it is 
first necessary to distinguish partial autonomous vehicles 
from completely autonomous vehicles.  A partially 
autonomous vehicle could involve a range of various safety 
systems, such as a warning system that alerts the driver 
when the vehicle strays out of its lane or a collision avoidance 
systems that slows or stops the vehicle before it contacts 
another vehicle or object.21  These partial autonomous 
systems will shift some, but not all, of the responsibility for 
accident avoidance from the driver to the vehicle, presumably 
reducing the risk of accidents (since that is the very purpose 
of the system).  With a fully autonomous vehicle, however, the 
responsibility for avoiding an accident shifts entirely to the 
vehicle and the components of its accident avoidance systems. 
The liability implications of an accident that results from 
a failure of a vehicle’s accident avoidance system will be 
similar, regardless of whether the vehicle is partially or fully 
autonomous.  When the driver has a choice to turn on the 
autonomous system and exercised that choice negligently, the 
apportionment of responsibility between the car and driver 
 
 20. In a study mandated by Congress of 5471 car accidents, the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) found that 30.8% of accidents 
involved a single vehicle, 57.2% involved two vehicles, and 12% involved three 
or more vehicles.    U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., DOT HS 811 059 NATIONAL MOTOR 
VEHICLE CRASH CAUSATION SURVEY: REPORT TO CONGRESS 17 (2008). 
 21. See NIDHI KALRA ET AL., LIABILITY AND REGULATION OF AUTONOMOUS 
VEHICLE TECHNOLOGIES 3–4 (2009) (California PATH Research Report UCB-
ITS-PRR-2009-28); Sven A. Beiker, Legal Aspects of Autonomous Driving, 52 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1145 (2010) (Report for the Center for Automotive 
Research at Stanford (CARS), Stanford University); Moore & Lu, supra note 1, 
at 6–8. 
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may be more difficult.  For example, if the instruction manual 
instructed the owner not to use the autonomous vehicle in 
certain weather conditions, or on specific types of traffic 
patterns, but the owner does so anyway, the driver may be 
held at least partially at fault.  Similarly, if the driver failed 
to utilize, or was negligent in utilizing an available over-ride 
mechanism to assume control of the vehicle,22 he or she may 
be allocated some or all of the blame for a resulting accident.  
In most cases though, especially those involving a dedicated 
and totally autonomous vehicle, the driver is unlikely to be a 
factor in the liability determination. 
Because drivers are found to be at fault in a large 
majority of current automobile accidents,23 removing the 
driver from the liability equation in autonomous vehicles will 
have important implications.  Of course, by removing driver 
error as a factor, the frequency of accidents should go down, 
which is one of the key potential benefits of an autonomous 
vehicle in the first place.  When an accident does occur 
though, the vehicle manufacturer, or some other party 
involved in the design, manufacture, or operation of the 
autonomous vehicle is likely to be held liable for a higher 
proportion of the accidents.  This will be more likely to occur 
with autonomous vehicles than it currently does with 
conventional vehicles.24  In other words, when an autonomous 
vehicle does crash, most likely something went wrong with 
 
 22. Moore & Lu, supra note 1, at 8 (discussing switchable on-and-off 
autonomous control system). 
 23. In the National Motor Vehicle Crash Causation Survey, NHTSA found 
that driver factors was the primary cause of the accident in 5096 of 5471 
accidents studied, whereas vehicle problems were the primary cause of 130 
accidents, and road conditions or weather conditions were the primary cause of 
135 accidents.  U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., supra note 20, at 23–26. 
 24. D. RANDAL AYERS, VA. TRANSP. RESEARCH COUNCIL, VTRC 94-R6, TORT 
REFORM AND “SMART” HIGHWAYS: ARE LIABILITY CONCERNS IMPEDING THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF COST-EFFECTIVE INTELLIGENT VEHICLE-HIGHWAY SYSTEMS? 
26–27 (1994), available at http://ntl.bts.gov/DOCS/ayers.html.  There are two 
primary theories by which a vehicle manufacturer can be held liable for a 
vehicle accident.  The first, and the one most relevant here, is that a “defect” in 
a vehicle caused or substantially contributed to the accident.  The second 
theory, which may not be appreciably different for conventional and 
autonomous vehicles, is that deficiencies in the vehicle’s “crashworthiness” 
result in greater injuries from an accident than should have resulted.  See 
Haberkorn v. Chrysler Corp., 533 N.W.2d 373, 379–80 (Mich. App. Ct. 1995) 
(holding vehicle manufacturer had the duty to design its product to eliminate 
any unreasonable risk of foreseeable injury as a result of a collision). 
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the collision avoidance system or the vehicle encountered 
conditions that it was not adequately programmed to 
address.25  Unlike a conventional vehicle crash, where the 
vehicle malfunction involves some sort of defect, such as a tire 
blowout or gas tank explosion, the malfunction in an 
autonomous vehicle will usually be a programming error or 
system failure that could implicate several different 
potentially liable parties.26 
If an autonomous vehicle malfunctioned and caused an 
accident, one or more of several entities could be held liable.27  
The list of potential parties includes the vehicle 
manufacturer, the manufacturer of a component used in the 
autonomous system, the software engineer who programmed 
the code for the autonomous operation of the vehicle, and the 
road designer in the case of an intelligent road system that 
helps control the vehicle.28  The various component parts and 
their respective roles in causing a malfunction may be hard to 
discern and separate for the purpose of assigning 
responsibility.29  In most cases, it will be the vehicle 
manufacturer who will, for both practical and doctrinal 
reasons, be the party held liable for a crash involving an 
 
 25. See Moore & Lu, supra note 1 (discussing that the greatest impediments 
to autonomous vehicles is decision-making under conditions of uncertainty and 
operating the vehicle safely under unusual weather and environmental 
conditions). 
 26. See Beiker, supra note 21, at 1152 (“As the vehicle navigates itself 
through traffic, it makes ‘mission-critical’ decisions, which, in a narrow range of 
circumstances, can and will contribute to accidents.  Such an event cannot 
necessarily be classified as a technical failure, however, the same way as, for 
instance, a damaged tire.”). 
 27. See Mark H. Chignell et al., The Principles of Caveat Vendor, Caveat 
Emptor and Caveat Operator in Robotic Safety, 8 J. OCCUPATIONAL ACCIDENTS 
79, 83 (1986) (discussing possible liable parties in accident caused by 
autonomous system generally). 
 28. This list assumes that the driver is not liable because it had no direct 
control over the functioning of the autonomous vehicle. 
 29. Wendell Wallach, From Robots to Techno Sapiens: Ethics, Law and 
Public Policy in the Development of Robotics and Neurotechnologies, 3 LAW, 
INNOVATION & TECH. 185, 194 (2011); Calo, supra note 14, at 597 (“It is 
extremely difficult to discover whether software, as opposed to hardware, is 
responsible for the glitch that led to an accident.”).  An additional complexity is 
that a truly autonomous system self-teaches new behaviors based on 
experience.  Thus, the vehicle may act based on such self-learning to cause an 
accident that may have been inconsistent with the initial programming for 
which the manufacturer was responsible.  See Robert Sparrow, Killer Robots, 24 
J. APPLIED PHIL. 62, 70 (2007). 
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autonomous vehicle.30  The practical argument is that the 
vehicle manufacturer will usually have the “deep pockets” 
that the injured plaintiff will seek to target.  From a doctrinal 
perspective, the vehicle manufacturer, as the party ultimately 
responsible for the final product, will be the most likely party 
to be found liable.  For example, the manufacturer of a 
component part is not liable for defects in the final product 
over which it had no control, although it is liable if the part 
was defective when the component left the manufacturer.  A 
similar rule is likely to apply to the software engineer.31  So, 
unless the component part or software engineer produced a 
product that was clearly defective, the vehicle manufacturer 
will be the party most likely to be fingered for liability, 
although there will likely be cases where other parties are 
sued. 
One other dynamic that may be different in autonomous 
vehicle crashes is the “who is liable” category in the context of 
multi-vehicle crashes.  In conventional vehicle accidents, an 
injured person usually sues the manufacturer of his or her 
own vehicle for failing to provide a crashworthy vehicle.  
There are scenarios where the first driver’s vehicle 
malfunctions and causes the accident, in which the second 
driver may sue the manufacturer of the first vehicle for any 
injuries incurred as a result of the accident.  But those 
scenarios tend to be the minority in conventional crash 
cases—most of the time an injured driver is suing the 
manufacture of his or her own vehicle.  In a crash between 
two or more vehicles—where at least one vehicle is an 
autonomous vehicle, and a malfunction or ill-advised 
 
 30. For example, the manufacturer of a component is largely protected from 
liability for failure to warn when it is integrated into a sophisticated product.  
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCT LIABILITY § 5 cmt. b (1997) 
(“The component seller is required to provide instructions and warnings 
regarding risks associated with the use of the component product. . . .  However, 
when a sophisticated buyer integrates a component into another product, the 
component seller owes no duty to warn either the immediate buyer or ultimate 
consumers of dangers arising because the component is unsuited for the special 
purpose to which the buyer puts it.”). 
 31. Computer programming is a service rather than a product, and thus the 
actions of a computer programmer will be evaluated under a negligence or 
malpractice standard rather than under products liability.  Frances E. Zollers et 
al., No More Soft Landings for Software: Liability for Defects in an Industry 
That Has Come of Age, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 745 
(2005). 
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maneuver by that vehicle allegedly contributed to the 
accident—all injured persons in the accident are likely to sue 
the manufacturer of the autonomous vehicle. 
III. RELATIVE RISK ISSUES 
Relative risk issues are likely to be the most important 
variables affecting the liability exposure of autonomous 
vehicles, and consequently, their economic viability.32  These 
relative risk issues apply in several layers.  The first layer is 
the threshold question of whether autonomous vehicles will 
increase or decrease the frequency and severity of vehicle 
collisions.  One of the key drivers pushing the development of 
autonomous vehicles is improved safety.  It is therefore 
presumed that an autonomous vehicle would be safer than a 
conventional vehicle.33  If, to the contrary, an autonomous 
vehicle raised net accident risks, it would likely not be viable 
for widespread use.  A manufacturer that substitutes a 
riskier product for a safer product will generally expose itself 
to lawsuits and runaway liability. 
Thus, absent exceptional circumstances or applications, 
autonomous vehicles will only be viable if they are safer than 
the conventional vehicles they replace.  This follows from the 
presumption that safety is one of the primary motivating 
objectives of creating autonomous vehicles.  As a New York 
Times story noted, “[r]obot drivers react faster than humans, 
have 360-degree perception and do not get distracted, sleepy 
or intoxicated . . . .”34  But even if the autonomous vehicles are 
safer overall, compared to conventional vehicles, they will 
still be subject to liability when malfunctions or other failures 
result in accidents and associated injuries.  Most accidents 
involving an autonomous vehicle will be the result of the 
autonomous system failing, because, as discussed above, 
there will not be a driver to blame for the accident.35 
 
 32. Relative risk is the ratio of the risk in the population of interest (in this 
case autonomous vehicles) divided by the risk in the background or control 
population (in this case, conventional non-autonomous vehicles).  See Michael D. 
Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Substances 
Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 NW. U. L. 
REV. 643, 647 (1992). 
 33. See Moore & Lu, supra note 1, at 3–4. 
 34. John Markoff, Google Cars Drive Themselves, in Traffic, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 9, 2010, at A1. 
 35. Of course there will be some accidents involving autonomous vehicles 
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There are many examples of products that have a net 
safety benefit that are still subject to liability when an injury 
results.  The litigation against vaccine manufacturers, for 
example, clearly illustrates this paradox.  The public health 
benefit of vaccines is undeniable, yet they are so frequently 
the source of lawsuits that federal preemption laws had to be 
passed to protect their manufacturers.36  Even with these 
protections in place, vaccine manufacturers continue to be 
held liable for the rare instances in which their products 
cause injuries that do not fall within the protections of the 
federal legislation.37  Automobile manufacturers have faced 
similar liability threats after incorporating various features 
designed to improve the safety of their automobiles, such as 
anti-lock braking systems38 and airbags.39  General Motors, 
for example, was sued by a woman and her family after the 
passenger-side airbags in their vehicle failed to deploy in a 
collision with an eighteen-wheeler, resulting in permanent 
and severe injuries to the woman.40  Despite the fact that 
passenger-side airbags were not required by the National 
Highway Transportation Safety Commission at the time, the 
jury found the airbags to be defective and awarded the 
woman and her family $18.5 million in damages.41 
Although the overall safety benefit of autonomous 
vehicles will not provide a complete liability shield, 
manufacturers of such products may be able to use this safety 
benefit in their defense.  In many product liability cases, the 
manufacturer defends the safety of its product, and the 
plaintiffs attack its riskiness—by comparing the product to 
 
that are the fault of the driver of the other vehicle, assuming it is not 
autonomous.  This also assumes that the vehicle is fully autonomous and the 
passenger had no way to override the autonomous system, or that the vehicle 
was partially autonomous but the driver was not negligent in his or her failure 
to prevent or mitigate the autonomous system’s error. 
 36. National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1–300aa-34 
(1986). 
 37. See, e.g., Strong v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 261 S.W.3d 493 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2007) (upholding a jury’s $8.5 million verdict to a consumer who contracted 
paralytic polio from an oral polio vaccine). 
 38. Baluchinsky v. Gen. Motors Corp., 670 N.Y.S.2d 536 (App. Div. 1998). 
 39. See, e.g., Morton International v. Gillespie, 39 S.W.3d 651 (Tex. Ct. App. 
2001) (affirming trial court’s $950,000 award to a woman who was injured when 
the deployment of her airbag was delayed during an accident); Gen. Motors 
Corp. v. Burry, 203 S.W.3d 514 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006). 
 40. See Gen. Motors Corp., 203 S.W.3d 514. 
 41. Id. 
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alternative designs and competing products on the market.  
An example is the defense by General Motors (“GM”) of its 
C/K pickup in a series of lawsuits in the 1990s.42  Plaintiffs in 
these suits alleged that GM’s placement of the gas tank on 
the side of the model, outside the vehicle frame, created an 
increased risk of fatal fires after side impacts.  GM attempted 
to defend the safety of its vehicle with comparative analyses, 
contending that the overall crashworthiness of its vehicles 
was better than most vehicles on the road.  GM further 
argued that even if its vehicles were prone to a slightly 
increased risk of fire fatalities from side impacts on the side 
with the gas tank, they had an equivalent or lower rate of 
fatalities and fire fatalities from all types of accidents.43  
There is an inevitable trade-off in the placement of the gas 
tank—putting the gas tank in one location (e.g., side of 
vehicle) increases the fire risk from impacts in that region of 
the vehicle, but also decreases the risks from impacts in other 
regions where the tank could have been located, but was not 
(e.g., the rear of vehicle).44  This argument of overall superior 
safety was largely ineffective with juries, as they returned 
adverse verdicts against GM, including large punitive 
damages awards.45 
Parties have also attempted to use comparative risk 
evidence in all-terrain vehicle (“ATV”) litigation.  The courts 
generally exclude the defendant from introducing 
comparative risk data showing the relative safety of ATVs 
compared to other recreational activities, such as riding 
snowmobiles and motorcycles, on the basis that such 
comparative risk evidence is irrelevant and unduly 
 
 42. E.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Moseley, 447 S.E.2d 302 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).  
See Terence Moran, GM Burns Itself, AM. LAW., Apr. 1993, at 68–83. 
 43. GENERAL MOTORS, EVALUATION OF THE SAFETY OF GM 1973-87 C/K 
PICKUP TRUCKS, PART I: INITIAL RESPONSE OF THE GENERAL MOTORS 
CORPORATION TO NHTSA LETTER OF APRIL 9, 1993 (Apr. 30, 1993) (copy on file 
with author); Moran, supra note 42, at 69, 78. 
 44. Walter Olson, The Most Dangerous Vehicle on the Road, WALL ST. J., 
Feb. 9, 1993, at A16, available at http://walterolson.com/articles/gmtrucks.html 
(“Any possible placement of the fuel tank ‘causes’ some accidents and averts 
others.  Respectable designers have tried every gas-tank location at one time or 
another . . . . All have been rejected at other times as unsafe.”). 
 45. Moran, supra note 42, at 81; Sam LaManna, GM Verdict Could Affect 
Future Cases, NAT’L L.J., May 3, 1993, at 21, 25; GM v. Moseley, 447 S.E.2d 
302, 305 (Ga. App. Ct. 1994).  Jury awarded $101 million in punitive damages 
against GM.  Id. 
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prejudicial.46  In cases where the plaintiff “opened the door” to 
such evidence by introducing reports on the statistical risks of 
ATVs, however, the defendant was permitted to introduce its 
comparative risk evidence to impeach the plaintiff’s evidence 
and to argue against punitive damages.47  Such comparative 
risk evidence, when allowed, seems to be effective for the 
defendant.  Plaintiffs appealed (unsuccessfully) a verdict in 
their own favor, in at least one instance, to challenge the 
introduction of comparative risk information on rebuttal.  The 
plaintiffs presumably concluded that the comparative risk 
evidence substantially reduced their recovery.48 
An autonomous vehicle manufacturer could, therefore, 
try to defend its vehicle in court by demonstrating that the 
vehicle is safer overall than the conventional vehicles it 
replaces.  This argument is likely to be unsuccessful when an 
accident was caused by a clear defect or malfunction in the 
vehicle design, especially if the defect could have been 
prevented or fixed by an alternative design.  The cost-benefit 
(or risk-utility) argument will not depend on whether the at-
fault autonomous vehicle is better overall than a traditional 
vehicle, but whether the autonomous vehicle technology could 
have been tweaked to make it safer.  In principle, the cost-
benefit analysis is based on the knowledge that the 
manufacturer had when the vehicle was manufactured.  In 
practice, however, hindsight from the accident that actually 
occurred will inevitably provide new insights into how the 
technology could have been made safer, which will then be 
imputed to the manufacturer.  Given the complexity of an 
autonomous system, a plaintiff’s expert will almost always be 
able to testify (with the benefit of hindsight) that the 
manufacturer should have known about and adopted the 
alternative, safer design. 
The manufacturer cannot possibly anticipate every 
possible scenario the vehicle will encounter, especially for a 
technology as complex as autonomous driving systems.  For 
 
 46. Bittner v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 533 N.W.2d 476 (Wisc. 1995) 
(overturning verdict for defense based on improper admission of comparative 
risk evidence); Kava v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 48 P.3d 1170, 1172 (Alaska 2002) 
(upholding exclusion of comparative risk data in defendant’s case-in-chief). 
 47. Hulmes v. Honda Motor Co., 960 F. Supp. 844, 864 (D.N.J. 1997); Kava, 
48 P.3d at 1174. 
 48. Kava, 48 P.3d at 1173–74. 
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the situations it does anticipate, the manufacturer can 
usually design the system to minimize the risk of an accident.  
The problem is that most accidents will result from situations 
that the manufacturer or designer did not anticipate.  This 
will open the manufacturer to second-guessing by the 
plaintiff’s expert that an adjustment would have provided a 
safer alternative system that would have avoided the accident 
in question.49  The manufacturer will almost always lose the 
cost-benefit argument, conducted in hindsight in the 
litigation context, when it focuses at the micro-scale between 
slightly different versions of the autonomous system.  This is 
because the cost of not implementing the potential 
improvement will usually be severe—the loss of one or more 
lives or other serious injury, compared to the relatively small 
cost of the marginal improvement that might have prevented 
the accident.50  The technology is potentially doomed if there 
are a significant number of such cases, because the liability 
burden on the manufacturer may be prohibitive of further 
development.  Thus, even though an autonomous vehicle may 
be safer overall than a conventional vehicle, it will shift the 
responsibility for accidents, and hence liability, from drivers 
to manufacturers.  The shift will push the manufacturer away 
from the socially-optimal outcome—to develop the 
autonomous vehicle.51 
One final aspect of relative risk in liability 
determinations will be the jurors’ (and to a lesser extent, 
judges’) perceptions about autonomous vehicles.  Liability 
determinations always involve an element of jury emotion 
and ethical response.52  It is not clear how juries will respond 
to autonomous vehicles, especially with hindsight bias after 
the vehicle has been in an accident that has injured the 
plaintiff sitting before them.  Some jurors may value the 
 
 49. If the accident was caused by an aspect of the autonomous vehicle that 
could not easily have been foreseen or fixed, and which involved a tradeoff 
inherent in moving to the safer autonomous design, the argument against 
liability will be much stronger. 
 50. Of course, from a prospective perspective, there are almost an infinite 
number of improvements that could be made to slightly improve safety.  In 
many cases, these improvements will only appear justified after an accident has 
occurred.  As is often stated, hindsight is perfect. 
 51. See KALRA ET AL., supra note 21, at 30. 
 52. See W. Kip Viscusi, Jurors, Judges, and the Mistreatment of Risk by the 
Courts, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 107, 135 (2001); Erica Beecher-Monas, Heuristics, 
Biases, and the Importance of Gatekeeping, 2003 MICH. STATE L. REV. 987. 
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effort made by manufacturers in producing a complex 
technology product that provides overall safety and other 
benefits.  Alternatively, jurors could perceive autonomous 
vehicles as a premature, and even reckless, foray that 
deserves to be soundly punished and deterred.53  The latter 
reaction may be even stronger in the context of a lawsuit over 
an accident allegedly caused by an autonomous vehicle.  
There is some evidence that lay persons composing a jury are 
suspicious of unfamiliar and exotic-edge technologies, 
regardless of their actual probability of causing harm.54  This 
research could be a concern for manufacturers of all novel 
high-tech products, including autonomous vehicles.  
Moreover, a phenomenon called “betrayal aversion” finds that 
people often have a strong emotional reaction against a safety 
innovation that actually causes harm, even if the net effect of 
the innovation is to improve safety.55  For example, the jury 
verdict against GM for its C/K pickup case, involving an 
award of over $100 million in punitive damages, suggests 
that juries are prone to outrage against a high-tech 
manufacturer because of the increased risk created by one 
type of accident This result was reached even though the 
overall crashworthiness of the vehicle was equivalent or 
superior to most other vehicles on the road.56 
IV. LEGAL AND POLICY PROTECTIONS 
The above analysis suggests that liability may present a 
serious barrier for the production and development of 
autonomous vehicles, even if the products are socially 
beneficial overall.  The shift in liability from drivers to 
manufacturers, notwithstanding the overall decrease in total 
accidents (and liability), may deter manufacturers from 
 
 53. Beiker, supra note 21, at 1152 (“Overreaction [by juries] is a clear 
danger . . . .”); Moore & Lu, supra note 1, at 5 (consumers will expect 
autonomous vehicles to function as safely or safer than driver-controlled 
vehicles). 
 54. Paul Slovic & Ellen Peters, Risk Perception and Effect, 15 CURRENT 
DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 322 (2006); Yuval Rottenstreich & Ran Kivetz, 
On Decision Making Without Likelihood Judgment, 101 ORGANIZATIONAL 
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 74 (2006). 
 55. Jonathan J. Koehler and Andrew D. Gershoff, Betrayal Aversion: When 
Agents of Protection Become Agents of Harm, 90 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & 
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 244 (2003). 
 56. Id. 
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developing autonomous vehicle technologies.57  Moreover, 
while manufacturers may be able to transfer some of those 
costs back to drivers through higher vehicle prices, the risk 
discounting that consumers apply, in which they undervalue 
products that reduce future risks, will prevent consumers 
from investing in such products at a socially optimal level.58 
There are some possible legal and policy tools that may 
help protect manufacturers from liability.  One such tool 
within the litigation system is the assumption of risk defense.  
Outside the litigation system, another tool is the pursuit of 
legislation that provides immunity or other defenses to 
manufacturers.  Legislation could help minimize liability, or 
alternatively, the National Highway Safety Traffic 
Administration (“NHTSA”) could promulgate regulations that 
expressly preempt state tort actions. 
A. Assumption of Risk Defense 
The assumption of risk defense provides that a product 
user who knowingly accepts the risks of a potentially 
hazardous product assumes some or all of the responsibility 
for any harm that may befall them from use of the product.59  
Such a defense requires that the product user understand 
and willingly assume the risks.60  Thus, for such a defense to 
apply to autonomous vehicles, the manufacturer would have 
to fully disclose the potential risks of the vehicle, including 
the likely failure modes and some approximate sense of their 
probability.  Such a defense would be stronger if the driver of 
an autonomous vehicle signed a written waiver accepting the 
risk of the vehicle.  Even in these circumstances, however, 
courts often refuse to recognize the defense.  Assumption of 
risk has been merged into the comparative negligence 
analysis and is no longer recognized as a separate defense in 
many states.  The recent Restatement (Third) of 
Apportionment of Liability rejects a general non-contractual 
 
 57. AYERS, supra note 24, at 2. 
 58. Id. at 27–28. 
 59. Eric A. Feldman & Alison Stein, Assuming the Risk: Tort Law, Policy, 
and Politics on the Slippery Slopes, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 259 (2010). 
 60. E.g., Murphy v. Steeplechase Amuse. Co., 166 N.E. 173, 174 (N.Y. 1929) 
(holding that riders on an amusement ride assume the obvious risk of the 
attraction); Chepkevich v. Hidden Valley Resort, L.P., 2 A.3d 1174, 1186 (Pa. 
2010) (holding that a skier assumed risk of injury from ski lift). 
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assumption of risk defense.61  Moreover, even if the defense 
does apply, it would only extend to the owner and possibly 
passengers of the autonomous vehicle, not to the occupants of 
the other vehicle. 
B. Legislative Protections 
Another line of defense for autonomous vehicle 
manufacturers would be legislation at either the federal or 
state level that would protect against, or limit, liability.62  The 
rationale for such legislative intervention would be supported 
by the fact that autonomous vehicles represent a socially 
beneficial technology that may be hindered by real or 
perceived liability concerns.  Of course, providing such 
legislative protection from liability has its downside—it 
diminishes, if not eliminates, the incentives for 
manufacturers to make marginal improvements in the safety 
of their products in order to prevent liability.  The net value 
and hence wisdom of such legislative interventions will 
therefore depend on how they are constructed and the 
balance they strike between these positive and negative 
incentives. 
While it is relatively rare for legislatures to intervene to 
protect specific technologies or products from liability, there 
are some precedents regarding comparative technologies.  At 
the federal level, Congress adopted legislation severely 
restricting the form and amount of liability that courts could 
impose from Y2K-related problems.63  Similarly, Congress 
enacted the Price-Anderson Nuclear Industries Indemnity Act 
in 1957 to protect the nuclear industry from excessive 
liability from nuclear accidents.64  The Oil Pollution Act of 
 
 61. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 2 cmt. 
f (2000). 
 62. See Wallach, supra note 29, at 194, 196 (discussing incentives of 
autonomous product manufacturers to seek legislation providing liability 
protection); Calo, supra note 14, at 601–09 (proposing limited immunity from 
liability for manufacturers of autonomous systems). 
 63. Year 2000 Responsibility and Readiness Act, Pub. Law No: 106-37 
(1999) (limits Y2K liability in two ways: (a) by limiting it to proportional rather 
than joint and several liability; and (b) by requiring clear and convincing 
evidence of damage and limiting the amount of damages to the lesser of 
$250,000 or three-times compensatory damages).  Y2K refers to the potential 
problems that were anticipated to result from computers failing to accurately 
interpret the date when the calendar reached the year 2000. 
 64. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (2006). 
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1990 created the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, which sets 
caps on liability for oil spills.65  The Public Readiness and 
Emergency Preparedness Act of 2005 provides drug makers 
with immunity from liability for injuries caused by vaccines 
during declared public health emergencies (e.g., avian flu 
epidemic).66  The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act was 
enacted in 1986 to limit liability for childhood vaccines, in 
response to concerns that liability would force many suppliers 
of such vaccines out of business.67  The General Aviation 
Revitalization Act of 1994 immunized manufacturers of small 
planes and small plane parts from liability for a period of 
eighteen years in response to the potential for widespread 
bankruptcy in that industry.68 
At the state level, several legislatures have adopted laws 
to limit liability in a number of different arenas.  For 
example, many states have adopted laws that cap allowable 
damages in medical malpractice actions, largely in an effort 
to encourage physicians to continue to practice medicine in 
their states and to lower the overall cost of health care.69  
Similarly, almost all states have taken the initiative to place 
some limit on the amount of punitive damages that their 
courts can award.70  These efforts illustrate states’ propensity 
to ameliorate the liability concerns faced by vulnerable, but 
promising, technologies like autonomous vehicles. 
C. State Preemption 
A third possible protection for manufacturers of 
autonomous vehicles is federal preemption of state tort 
actions.  In particular, a Federal Motor Vehicle Safety 
Standard, (“FMVSS”) adopted by NHTSA, may preempt state 
tort actions that are in conflict with the standard.  There are 
 
 65. 33 U.S.C. § 2704 (2006). 
 66. 42 U.S.C. § 329 (2006). 
 67. 2 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1–300aa-4 (2006). 
 68. Pub. L. No. 103-298, § 2(a), 108 Stat. 1552 (1994) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 
40101 notes (2006) (cited in Calo, supra note 14, at 603 n.220). 
 69. FRED J. HELLINGER & WILLIAM E. ENCINOSA, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY: THE 
IMPACT OF STATE LAWS LIMITING MALPRACTICE AWARDS ON THE GEOGRAPHIC 
DISTRIBUTION OF PHYSICIANS 3 (2003), available at http://www.ahrq.gov/ 
research/tortcaps/tortcaps.htm. 
 70. Punitive Damages Reform, AMERICAN TORT REFORM ASSOCIATION, 
http://www.atra.org/issues/punitive-damages-reform (last visited Apr. 20, 2012). 
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two obstacles to this protection.  First, NHTSA has not 
adopted FMVSSs specific to autonomous vehicles.  It is 
conceivable, however, that the agency may adopt such 
standards in the future if autonomous vehicles are likely to 
become prevalent and raise unique safety issues.  The second 
obstacle is that most FMVSSs do not preempt state tort 
actions.71  Courts have found preemption only in the narrow 
context where the state tort action actually interferes with 
the achievement of the objective of the federal standard.72  In 
construing the federal government’s objective behind a 
FMVSS, the courts looked at the regulation’s history, 
NHTSA’s contemporaneous explanation of the regulation’s 
purpose, and the agency’s current view of its preemptive 
effect.73  Thus, if the agency so intended, NHTSA may be able 
to write and explain future safety standards for autonomous 
vehicles in a way that preempted some, or all, state tort 
actions.74 
CONCLUSION 
Autonomous vehicles will increase the safety of vehicle 
travel by reducing vehicle collisions.  Ironically, autonomous 
vehicles are likely to increase the liability exposure of vehicle 
manufacturers.  Autonomous vehicles will shift the 
responsibility for avoiding accidents from the driver to the 
vehicle manufacturer.  Although the autonomous vehicle is 
expected to result in a net decrease in the number of 
accidents, it will create new modes of failure that will be 
attributed to the vehicle.  These failures are likely to generate 
lawsuits against the vehicle manufacturer and possibly 
manufacturers of components of the autonomous system.  
 
 71. See, e.g., Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1131 (2011)  
(holding that the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard, giving auto 
manufacturers the choice of installing either simple lap belts or lap-and-
shoulder belts on rear inner seats, did not pre-empt state tort claims seeking to 
impose liability on manufacturer for installing simple lap belts on the rear inner 
seat of a minivan). 
 72. Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000) (preempting 
state tort action alleging the failure to install air bags when federal standard 
only requires installation of air bags in some vehicles of the applicable model 
year). 
 73. Id. at 875–85. 
 74. It may also be possible to address some of the liability concerns 
discussed in this Article through innovative insurance policies, but such ideas 
are discussed elsewhere in this symposium issue. 
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Plaintiffs will target manufacturers because they will often be 
most at fault for the malfunction that caused the accident and 
they have the deepest pockets of all involved parties.  
Manufacturers of autonomous vehicles are likely to argue 
that their “fault” should be evaluated in a comparative 
context, with credit given to the net safety benefits of the 
autonomous vehicles.  The history of such arguments made by 
manufacturers of other, safer, products suggest that this 
comparative or net risk assessment is unlikely to succeed.  If 
that prediction comes true, and if autonomous vehicles have a 
significant rate of failure (likely in the initial years at least), 
liability may be a barrier that blocks the introduction of this 
socially beneficial new technology. 
If this problem is serious enough, it may require greater 
use of an assumption of risk defense, legislative liability 
protection, or preemption, to ensure autonomous vehicles are 
not unduly impeded by liability concerns.  Of course, one 
disadvantage of these approaches is that by immunizing the 
internalization of accident costs from vehicle manufacturers, 
they may reduce the pressure on manufacturers to make 
incremental improvements in the safety of their autonomous 
systems.  Notwithstanding this limitation, it may be better to 
have autonomous vehicles sooner rather than later even if 
they are imperfect, given that even imperfect autonomous 
vehicles will be safer than vehicles on the road today. 
